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With respect, however, Panagopoulos does not succeed in showing that, in their stead, necessary prominence ought to be given to the place where the unjust factor arose. The value of his thesis lies most in demonstrating that the place where the unjust factor arose ought not to be treated as necessarily less significant than other considerations, such as the place where the pre-existing relationship is centred, the lex situs or the place of enrichment.

It may be that the most satisfactory approach is one which enables all features of the case to be taken into account and to be given such weight as is appropriate in the circumstances of the case. On his argument, such place is a more significant element of the tort than mere questions of causation and damage. First, it is not self-evident that the place where the tortious acts were committed is inherently more significant than the place where the damage was suffered.

In making that assertion, Panagopoulos relies heavily on cases decided in a jurisdictional setting. The same can be said about restitution for equitable wrongs, such as breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust. Panagopoulos accepts that such issues should be governed by a more general proper law approach.

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Tort law often involves cases in which compensation for loss is claimed, and more often than not only provides for personal and not proprietary remedies. We may consider the case where restitution is denied by the law of the place where the unjust factor arose, but is allowed by the law of the place where the conduct on the part of the defendant leading to the enrichment occurs or where a change of position occurs.

Applying the choice of law rules for tort as the touchstone, it could be said that the defendant ought to be required to make restitution just as easily as it could be said that the plaintiff ought not to be entitled to restitution.

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The flaw is also evident in the case where restitution is allowed by the law of the place where the unjust factor arose, but is denied by the law of the place where the defendant acted or where the change of position occurred. Applying the logic of the choice of law rules for tort, it is just as easy to conclude that the defendant should not be liable to make restitution as it is to conclude that the plaintiff should receive restitution.

With respect, it is submitted that it is not for at least six reasons. To develop the point, a closer analysis of his theory is necessary. This includes cases of mistake, illegitimate pressure and failure of consideration. All other possible connecting factors would seem to be irrelevant. In that last example, let us further assume that the property is land situated in State B, and the plaintiff seeks a proprietary remedy. In such situations, it may be difficult to justify the application of the law of State A unless State A is the forum and the law of State A is applicable on public policy grounds.

Although the appropriateness of giving presumptive effect to the place where the unjust factor arose is questionable, such an approach would at least have allowed for the application of State A law in the above examples. Yet the author allows himself no room to contend for such an approach.

It is not that far removed from a proper law test unregulated by any mandatory or presumptive sub-rules, a test which he criticises as too uncertain. As for cases where the claim for restitution arises out of a pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties, it may often be appropriate to give particular weight to the law governing the actual or anticipated contract between the parties under which the benefit was conferred.

With respect, the complete discounting of the lex situs and the place of enrichment is unsustainable. For example, where a restitutionary proprietary remedy is sought, it may be appropriate in some cases to give especial weight to the lex situs to govern unjust enrichment issues. This is particularly true when the enrichment is in the form of immovable property. This is again especially so where immovable property or the proceeds of its sale constitute the enrichment, [69] though it may also be appropriate to give the lex situs particular weight in other cases where the enrichment arises in connection with immovables.

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Such issues also reflect legal values, and can explain why restitution is or is not available. It is difficult to see why the law of the place where the unjust factor arose should necessarily have more to say about the liability if any to make restitution than the law of the place where the property in question is situated or the law of the place of enrichment. Although the place of enrichment can sometimes be fortuitous, that is not always so. Under his theory, the unjust factor usually arises in the place where the plaintiff acted or was impoverished or failed to receive an agreed reciprocation.

This gives an a priori preference to facts which relate to the plaintiff over facts which relate to the defendant, or indeed over other potentially relevant facts. It may be one thing, in the case of wrongdoing, to give particular weight to the place of commission of the alleged wrongful acts for the reason given by Panagopoulos; in that instance, the focus of the claim is often on the fault of the defendant. However, it is another thing in the case of unjust enrichment; in that situation, the enquiry is simply whether the defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff.

The focus of the claim is not always nor even usually the legitimacy of the conduct of the defendant, just as its focus is not always nor usually the legitimacy of the conduct of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is entitled to that wealth, the defendant is not, and vice versa.

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This overlooks the commercial interests of defendants, for instance in security of receipt and in avoiding liability arising under some foreign law. Panagopoulos does not say why the law of the place where the unjust factor arose should regulate such an issue. The immediate goal is to enable readers to obtain quality legal analysis that is easily accessible and, best of all, succinct. Readers can keep abreast of the daily highlights of legal news from around the nation and the world. IJPL provides an effective resource for comprehensive analysis of contemporary law issues to practicing attorneys, academia and the business community in a manner that fosters the intellectual development of students and professionals.

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Special Issues devoted to important topics in private law will occasionally be published. Editor in Chief Prof. This is in contrast to other commentators, who have tended to ignore the place where the unjust factor arose. Topics excluded from the scope of the book include subrogation, statutes and foreign judgments; these matters could be addressed in a second edition. The significant attention given by Panagopoulos to the question of jurisdiction in the context of claims for restitution is welcome. Any analysis of choice of law is enhanced by a proper understanding of the jurisdictional context in which the various claims arise.

In no area is this more true than jurisdiction over foreign land, a topic which receives some attention in the book. The author upholds the view, correctly, that courts have jurisdiction over restitutionary claims involving foreign land. Apart from cases that come under the ambit of the European Judgments Convention , [8] it is preferable to accept that a court has jurisdiction over claims for restitution in respect of foreign land because and when the claim is for a remedy which operates in personam, even if the claim involves the determination of rights in rem in foreign immovables.

Panagopoulos argues in chapter 8 that issues in unjust enrichment should be governed by the law of the place where the unjust factor arose or by the law of the place or legal system with which the unjust factor has its closest and most real connection. Panagopoulos gives a number of examples of the application of his proposed rule. These include: [13].

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This is a novel and courageous approach. With respect, however, Panagopoulos does not succeed in showing that, in their stead, necessary prominence ought to be given to the place where the unjust factor arose. The value of his thesis lies most in demonstrating that the place where the unjust factor arose ought not to be treated as necessarily less significant than other considerations, such as the place where the pre-existing relationship is centred, the lex situs or the place of enrichment. It may be that the most satisfactory approach is one which enables all features of the case to be taken into account and to be given such weight as is appropriate in the circumstances of the case.

On his argument, such place is a more significant element of the tort than mere questions of causation and damage. First, it is not self-evident that the place where the tortious acts were committed is inherently more significant than the place where the damage was suffered. In making that assertion, Panagopoulos relies heavily on cases decided in a jurisdictional setting.

The same can be said about restitution for equitable wrongs, such as breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust. Panagopoulos accepts that such issues should be governed by a more general proper law approach. Tort law often involves cases in which compensation for loss is claimed, and more often than not only provides for personal and not proprietary remedies. We may consider the case where restitution is denied by the law of the place where the unjust factor arose, but is allowed by the law of the place where the conduct on the part of the defendant leading to the enrichment occurs or where a change of position occurs.

Applying the choice of law rules for tort as the touchstone, it could be said that the defendant ought to be required to make restitution just as easily as it could be said that the plaintiff ought not to be entitled to restitution. The flaw is also evident in the case where restitution is allowed by the law of the place where the unjust factor arose, but is denied by the law of the place where the defendant acted or where the change of position occurred. Applying the logic of the choice of law rules for tort, it is just as easy to conclude that the defendant should not be liable to make restitution as it is to conclude that the plaintiff should receive restitution.

With respect, it is submitted that it is not for at least six reasons. To develop the point, a closer analysis of his theory is necessary. This includes cases of mistake, illegitimate pressure and failure of consideration. All other possible connecting factors would seem to be irrelevant. In that last example, let us further assume that the property is land situated in State B, and the plaintiff seeks a proprietary remedy.


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In such situations, it may be difficult to justify the application of the law of State A unless State A is the forum and the law of State A is applicable on public policy grounds. Although the appropriateness of giving presumptive effect to the place where the unjust factor arose is questionable, such an approach would at least have allowed for the application of State A law in the above examples.

Yet the author allows himself no room to contend for such an approach. It is not that far removed from a proper law test unregulated by any mandatory or presumptive sub-rules, a test which he criticises as too uncertain. As for cases where the claim for restitution arises out of a pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties, it may often be appropriate to give particular weight to the law governing the actual or anticipated contract between the parties under which the benefit was conferred.

With respect, the complete discounting of the lex situs and the place of enrichment is unsustainable. For example, where a restitutionary proprietary remedy is sought, it may be appropriate in some cases to give especial weight to the lex situs to govern unjust enrichment issues. This is particularly true when the enrichment is in the form of immovable property. This is again especially so where immovable property or the proceeds of its sale constitute the enrichment, [69] though it may also be appropriate to give the lex situs particular weight in other cases where the enrichment arises in connection with immovables.